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Abstract: Misinformation – information that is false or inaccurate – can continue to 
influence people’s memory and reasoning even after it has been corrected. Researchers 
have termed this the continued influence effect (CIE). However, to date, research has 
focused exclusively on examining the CIE in a single polarity, namely the ongoing effect of 
initially affirmed material that is later negated. No research has yet examined how reliance 
on outdated information may be affected if this polarity is reversed, that is, if initially-
negated information is reinstated. It also remains unclear how participants’ pre-existing 
beliefs may impact the acceptance of a correction, with prior evidence showing conflicting 
results. To investigate these questions, across two experiments we presented participants 
scoring high versus low on measures of relevant attitudes with fictional news reports that 
contained a piece of critical attitude-relevant information. This information was either true 
throughout, false throughout, initially-affirmed then retracted, or initially-negated then 
reinstated. Participants’ reliance on the critical information was subsequently measured 
with the use of inferential-reasoning items. Reinstatement of initially-negated information 
was insufficient to bring reliance on that information to a baseline level – that is, reliance on 
information presented as true throughout was greater than reliance on negated and then 
reinstated information. This result was symmetrical with the conventional CIE observed with 
a reversed polarity. The effect of participants’ pre-existing attitudes on continued reliance 
was equivocal. The results therefore suggest that the CIE is not contingent on polarity, 
raising questions about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. 
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Polarity and Attitude Effects in the Continued-Influence Paradigm 
Decades of research have provided compelling evidence that misinformation – 
information that is initially held as accurate but subsequently corrected – can continue to 
influence people’s judgements and decision making despite an acknowledged correction 
(e.g., Chan, Jones, Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 
2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016; 
Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; for reviews see Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & 
Cook, 2012; Schwarz, Newman, & Leach, 2016). This phenomenon can be observed even 
when people demonstrably remember and understand a correction (e.g., Johnson & Seifert, 
1994; Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003), or are explicitly warned at the outset that they 
may be exposed to misinformation (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010). Researchers have 
termed this pervasive finding the continued influence effect (CIE). 
However, previous CIE research has focused exclusively on the impact of corrective 
information in a single direction: In a typical study, participants encounter an initial 
affirmation of a critical piece of information, followed by its subsequent retraction. No 
research has yet investigated how continued influence may be affected if the narrative 
polarity is reversed; that is, if participants receive an initial negation of a critical piece of 
information followed by a subsequent reinstatement of that same information. Indeed, in 
today’s politically-charged climate of ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, members of the public 
may be more likely than ever before to encounter not only misinformation, but also 
misinforming negations of correct information (for instance, people may be exposed to the 
false claim “there is no global warming”; Lewandowsky et al., 2015; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, & Maibach, 2017). It is unclear how such an initial negation would 
affect people’s subsequent level of belief for the initially-negated but subsequently 




reinstated information – for example, if people encountered factual climate-change 
information in the media after having been exposed to climate-change denial. We propose 
two distinct possibilities: (a) a reinstatement of previously negated material may result in a 
‘reverse CIE’, whereby belief is increased, but not to the level expected if information had 
been presented as true throughout; or (b) a reinstatement of initially-negated information 
may result in memory being updated to the level of the true-throughout presentation or 
even beyond (which would constitute an ‘ironic rebound effect’). The two studies presented 
below were designed to adjudicate between these two possibilities (i.e., reverse-CIE or 
ironic rebound) by examining participants’ reliance on information that was initially-negated 
and subsequently reinstated.  
Considering the first possibility, given that the CIE reflects a primacy effect (i.e., 
initially presented misinformation appears to be difficult to overcome), just as a retraction is 
often unable to drive misinformation reliance down to a baseline, a reinstatement may be 
unable to fully neutralize an initial negation. This may occur either because the negation is 
encoded pragmatically as an assertion (i.e., simply as a single meaningful fact that asserts a 
certain state of the world), or because the constituent parts of the negated message―the 
‘core’ feature (‘X’) and its negation marker (‘not’) ― are incorporated into a single 
meaningful unit affirming the opposite, such that a statement ‘not-X’ may be encoded as 
‘therefore-Y’ (see Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). Importantly, in both cases the negation 
will be encoded as a single unit that is cognitively indistinct from the encoding of a piece of 
(initially-affirmed) misinformation in the typical CIE paradigm, plausibly implying that there 
should be no difference in the impact of a correction as a function of its polarity. That is, 
reinstatement would be followed by a reverse CIE that is the mirror image of the 
conventional CIE observed with a retraction of initially-affirmed information.  




This concept is consistent with both previous CIE research as well as theoretical 
models of knowledge revision. One such model in particular, the Knowledge Revision 
Components framework (KReC - Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014, for a detailed review see Gerrig 
& O’Brien, 2005; Kendeou, Butterfuss, Kim & van Boekel, 2019; Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014; 
Kendeou, Walsh, Smith & O’Brien, 2014), assumes that new information encoded into 
memory (e.g., the correction) has the potential to activate related pieces of information in 
memory through resonance-based retrieval processes (O’Brien et al., 1998, 2010; Rapp & 
Kendeou, 2009). In this framework, for knowledge revision to succeed, a correction needs to 
resonate with the initial, corresponding misinformation such that co-activation occurs, 
triggering conflict detection and subsequent information integration. If knowledge revision 
is successful, subsequent cues (such as inference questions) will activate an updated, 
integrated representation and no CIE occurs. If knowledge revision is unsuccessful, however, 
subsequent cues have the potential to selectively activate the initial misinformation, leading 
to a CIE. To the extent that negations are encoded as single meaningful units, the KReC 
framework makes no specific predictions about polarity, and thus may provide a plausible 
account of both CIE and reverse-CIE effects. 
Turning to the second possibility, in contrast to a retraction of initially-affirmed 
information, a reinstatement of initially-negated information may induce updating of 
memory to a level equivalent to, or even greater than, when that information is only-
affirmed. Such an outcome might result from an initial negation enhancing the familiarity of 
the critical information (especially if the negated statement is initially not well represented 
in memory; Mckinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; Reichle, Carpenter, & Just, 2000), which could 
potentially leave people with only a sense of the primary content and no strong memory for 
its negation. For example, Richard Nixon’s famous line “I am not a crook” may have left 




people with a sense of Nixon being associated with the term “crook” but a less clear sense 
of it being negated. Subsequent affirmative information may thus be particularly impactful 
as it is “sowed on fertile ground.” 
This possibility relies on the ‘schema-plus-tag’ model of negation comprehension, 
which suggests that a negation is encoded as a core supposition (‘X’) that is then associated 
with a negation-tag (‘not’; see Gilbert et al., 1990; Johnson & Seifert, 1998; Mayo et al., 
2004). Unlike under the previous possibility, the two constituent parts are not integrated 
into a single assertive representation. If negations are encoded in this manner, then the 
provision of a later reinstatement may combine with the initial core supposition, thereby 
resulting in its (ironic) strengthening. For example, suppose a person is provided with the 
information ‘not-X’, which creates two dissociated representations, the core (‘X’) and its 
negation-tag (‘not’; see Ecker et al., 2011). Upon later reinstatement, this critical piece of 
information ‘X’ is once again provided, this time as an affirmation. The initial negation 
therefore indirectly provides the kernel piece of information for its subsequent 
reinstatement, and the constituent ‘X’ in the initial ‘not-X’ may combine with the later ‘X’ to 
form a representation that is at least as strong as the one that would result from being 
exposed to ‘X’ on its own. Given that familiarity and repetition have been shown to be 
driving factors in people’s consequent level of belief in information (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, 
Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; DiFonzo, Beckstead, Stupak, & Walders, 2016; Ecker et al., 2011; 
Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2014; Stadler, Scharrer, Brummernhenrich, & Bromme, 2013; 
Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017), a repetition of initially-negated information in a later 
reinstatement may thus wipe out the initial negation completely (also see Ecker, Hogan, & 
Lewandowsky, 2017; Kendeou et al., 2014).  




In addition to this, and in contrast to an initial-affirmation, it is conceivable that the 
provision of an initial-negation creates an implicit assumption that there must be a degree 
of tacit belief, or at least plausibility, in the negated information. That is, people may think 
that a negation would not be provided unless it negated an unarticulated assumption. In the 
context of the example provided earlier, Richard Nixon’s “I am not a crook” speech may 
have made some people feel sceptical and therefore particularly ready to accept 
subsequent events that revealed the contrary to be true. On this account, a reinstatement 
would be highly effective, potentially resulting in an ironic rebound beyond when the 
information is true-throughout. Such an effect of scepticism requires that the initial 
negation is not integrated into a single meaningful unit, but instead as two dissociated 
representations, enabling a subsequent reinstatement to confirm the earlier scepticism and 
uniquely amplify the core (‘X’) message but not its negation-tag (‘not’). The notion of 
scepticism facilitating efficient updating (and potentially an ironic rebound) is consistent 
with research demonstrating that scepticism facilitates recognition of correct information 
and rejection of retracted falsehoods (Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Oberauer, & Morales, 2005).  
However, any discussion of the effects of misinforming information in the real world 
must also take into account the role of the recipient’s worldview, that is, their basic beliefs 
about how the world should operate (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). 
While typical CIE effects are readily demonstrable with fictitious, neutral materials, 
worldview factors (i.e., political partisanship, religion, etc.) have been shown to exert an 
influence on what information a person will accept (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 
2014; Kahne & Bowyer, 2017; Redlawsk, 2002; Schaffner & Roche, 2016; Sharot, Korn, & 
Dolan, 2011). While some research has found evidence to suggest that the ongoing 
influence of initially-acquired information is heightened if the subsequent retraction is 




worldview-incongruent (see Ecker & Ang, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2005, 2012), other 
studies have shown that  a retraction can be equally effective regardless of its congruence 
with a person’s worldview, suggesting that differences in post-retraction belief may simply 
reflect pre-retraction differences (Ecker et al., 2014; also see Wood & Porter, 2019). The 
role of worldview in the processing of retractions or corrections therefore remains 
somewhat unresolved. Moreover, the effects of worldview on the processing of initial 
negations and subsequent reinstatements are completely unknown. One possibility is that 
the potential scepticism effects discussed previously emerge as a function of worldview. 
That is, scepticism effects may be particularly apparent in situations where a person has a 
prior motivation to be sceptical; for instance, a staunch Democrat may be more sceptical 
about (initial-negation) claims made by Republican politicians (e.g. Richard Nixon) than a 
Republican, and a subsequent reinstatement may thus be more effective. 
Our studies therefore also examined the role of participants’ worldview. Across two 
experiments, we presented participants scoring higher versus lower on a prejudice measure 
with fictional news reports concerning a crime. For both experiments, a piece of critical 
worldview-relevant information was either provided, negated, reinstated, or retracted, and 
participants’ subsequent reliance on that critical information was examined. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a fictitious news report about a 
violent robbery that took place in a convenience store in south-western Australia. In total, 
four versions of the report were created. In two versions, the robber was initially described 
as being of Aboriginal descent, and in one of these two versions this information was later 
retracted (affirmed-then-retracted condition), whereas in the other it was not (only-affirmed 
condition). Two other versions of the report both initially described the robber as not being 




of Aboriginal descent. In one of these two versions, this initial denial was retracted 
(negated-then-reinstated condition), whereas in the other version it was not (only-negated 
condition). Participants were also split by their level of racial prejudice, measured by the 
Attitudes Toward Indigenous Australians scale (ATIA; Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 
2004). Experiment 1 therefore used a 2 (racial prejudice: high vs. low) × 4 (condition: only-
negated, negated-then-reinstated, only-affirmed, affirmed-then-retracted) between-
subjects design. 
Method 
Participants. Based upon an a-priori power analysis, Ecker and colleagues (2014) 
tested 144 participants (with a minimum sample size of 90 sufficient to detect a medium-
sized effect, ηp2 = .1; α = .05; 1 – β = .80). Given the similarity between this previous work 
and the current design we aimed to recruit a minimum of 192 participants (based on the 
inclusion of an extra condition beyond that used by Ecker and colleagues). Our final sample 
consisted of 207 participants, all undergraduate students from the University of Western 
Australia (140 females, 67 males; age range 17-47, M = 20.2 years, SD = 4.71). Three further 
participants were recruited but were excluded based on non-completion of the answer 
booklet. Participants were randomly allocated to the different script conditions (with the 
constraint of roughly equal cell sizes). A subset of n = 125 were selected from the upper and 
lower thirds of a population of students pre-screened with the ATIA (total N = 1,059). The 
remaining n = 82 participants were not pre-screened due to pragmatic reasons (i.e., lack of 
access to a pre-screened population), and were recruited as a random opportunity sample 
through advertisements.  
The ATIA scale (Pedersen et al., 2004) consists of 18 items, answered on 7-point 
Likert scales. Scores on the six reverse-coded items were transformed so that all items 




shared the same polarity (with higher scores indicating higher prejudice). Participants in the 
opportunity sample completed the ATIA scale during the experimental session, whereas 
pre-screened participants completed the ATIA only at pre-screening. Scores on the ATIA 
scale ranged from 18 to 106 (the minimum possible score is 18 and the maximum is 126). 
Participants were split into high and low racial-prejudice groups with a median split on the 
entire sample (Md = 40). The mean racial-prejudice score for the low prejudice group 
(n = 104) was M = 26.68 (SD = 4.78), and for the high prejudice group (n = 103) it was 
M = 63.17 (SD = 13.06). 
Stimuli (all stimuli are available at https://osf.io/jfsqm/). Stimuli were loosely 
based upon the news reports used in the study by Ecker and colleagues (2014). The fictional 
news reports consisted of either 12 (only-negated and only-affirmed conditions) or 13 
(negated-then-reinstated and affirmed-then-retracted conditions) messages concerning a 
robbery at a convenience store in the town of Margaret River, Western Australia. Across 
conditions, news reports differed in sentence 4, where the critical information concerning 
the race of the suspects was introduced (in all but the only-affirmed condition). The reports 
also differed in sentence 11 (sentence 10 in the only-affirmed condition), where depending 
on condition the information concerning the race of the suspects was initially-stated, 
retracted, or reinstated (or not mentioned in the only-negated condition; for detail see 
Table 1). 
Participants’ understanding of the report and their level of reliance on the critical 
race-related information was tested using an open-ended questionnaire booklet that was 
administered once a distractor anagram task had been completed. The booklet contained an 
event-summary question, eight fact-recall questions, and eleven inference questions. In the 




convenience sample, the ATIA scale was given at the end to avoid responses to the ATIA 
biasing responses to the inference questions.  
The event-summary question asked participants to supply a short summary of the 
event. The fact-recall questions targeted arbitrary event details unrelated to the critical 
race-related information (e.g., “In which town did the robbery take place”); these questions 
were included to allow for the potential exclusion of participants who had not adequately 
encoded the news report. The inference questions were designed to evoke references to 
the critical race-related information, while allowing participants to provide responses that 
did not relate to the race of the suspects. For example, the question “Why might the other 
two patrons of the store have suggested that the attackers may have been intoxicated?” 
could be answered by using race-related information (e.g., by referring to the stereotype 
that alcoholism is common in Aboriginal people), or by not referring to race-related 
information (e.g., by assuming that the perpetrators showed signs of intoxication such as 
slurred speech). The final question asking directly about the race of the suspects (“Were any 
Aboriginals involved in the robbery?”) was answered on a scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree).  
  












“[…] the suspects 
are local, male 
residents and 
none of them are 
of Aboriginal 
descent” 
“[…] the suspects 
are local, male 
residents and 
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“[…] the suspects 
are local, male 
residents and 
none of them are 
of Aboriginal 
descent” 
* This sentence appeared in message 10 
Procedure. Participants were first given an ethics-approved information sheet 
before providing written consent (in the pre-screened sample, participants received two 
information sheets and consented separately to the ATIA screening and the main 
experiment). Participants completed the encoding and distractor tasks on a computer using 
Microsoft PowerPoint. They were told that they were to read a report and that their 
memory for that report would be subsequently tested. Once participants were ready to 
begin, they pressed the space bar and the report was presented one message at a time. The 
presentation progressed to the subsequent message at a pre-determined pace of 0.25 
seconds per word. Following the presentation of the report, participants were given an 
unrelated anagram task that lasted for four minutes. Participants were then asked to open 
and complete the questionnaire booklet placed face down in-front of them. Once 
participants had completed the response booklet, they were debriefed. The entire 
experiment took approximately thirty minutes.  




Results (data available at https://osf.io/7ts9k/) 
All statistical analyses were conducted using both frequentist and Bayesian 
techniques, using the IBM SPSS software and the BayesFactor package for R (Morey, 2015), 
respectively. All analyses are thus reported with an associated p-value and Bayes Factor 
(BF). The BF reflects the likelihood of the observed data under the alternative hypothesis 
(BF10) relative to the likelihood of the data under the presumption of no effect (the null 
hypothesis). The value of the BF therefore represents the strength of the evidence for one 
model over another on a continuous scale. Although different categorisations exist (see 
Held & Ott, 2018), generally a BF of 1 represents equivocal evidence for either model, a BF 
between 1-3 is considered as weak evidence for the alternative, BFs between 3-10 as 
intermediate, BFs > 10 as strong evidence, and BFs > 100 as conclusive evidence for the 
alternative model over the null (Held & Ott, 2016; Kass & Raftery, 1995). Correspondingly, a 
BF10 < 1 is considered evidence for the null hypothesis with a strength equal to its reciprocal. 
Coding procedure. All open-ended questions were scored by a trained scorer who 
was blind to condition. To assess inter-rater reliability, a second trained scorer scored a 
subset of the questionnaires (n = 20; 5 per condition). Inter-rater reliability was found to be 
high for both fact-recall questions (r = .978) and inference items (r = .975).  
Fact-recall items were scored as incorrect (0) or correct (1). A score of 0.5 was 
possible for answers deemed partially correct. The maximum fact-recall score was 8. 
Inference items were scored 0 for no implication of an Aboriginal suspect, and 1 for an 
uncontroverted reference to an Aboriginal suspect. An example of a response scored 1 was 
“[…] community might start to feel threatened by Aboriginal males or females in the future” 
in response to the question “How is this event likely to impact social harmony in the area?”; 
by contrast, “[…] the arrest didn’t seem logical, and this might be seen as racial profiling and 




cause uproar” in response to the same question was scored 0. Ambiguous references were 
scored 0.5; for example, the response “Because the robbers spoke in a different dialect” in 
response to the question “Why might the injured patron have struggled to understand what 
the robbers were asking him to do?” may have referred to an Aboriginal dialect but did not 
state so explicitly, and was therefore given a partial score. The event-summary question was 
treated as an inference question and was scored in the same manner. The final inference 
question directly asked participants about the race of the suspects. Participants were 
required to respond to this item on a scale (scored from 0-7). In order to be consistent with 
the other inference questions, scores on this item were recoded to a continuous 0-1 scale 
and integrated with the scores from the ten inference questions and event-summary 
question to provide an overall average inference score ranging from 0 to 1. This score 
reflected participants’ tendency to rely on the critical information in their reasoning, and 
was our main dependent variable. 
Accuracy of recall. The mean level of fact-recall across conditions (expressed as 
proportion correct) was .69 (only-negated = .69; negated-then-reinstated = .67; only-
affirmed = .72; affirmed-then-retracted = .67). A 4 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
participants’ mean fact recall accuracy rates with the factors condition (negated-then-
reinstated, only-negated, only-affirmed, affirmed-then-retracted) and prejudice group (low, 
high) found no significant effects of condition [F(3,199) = 0.701, MSE = 2.33, p = .553, ƞ2p = 
.010], or prejudice group [F(1,199) = 2.39, MSE = 2.331, p = .123, ƞ2p = .012], as well as no 
interaction between the two [F(3,199) = 2.13, MSE = 2.331, p = .098, ƞ2p = .031]. These 
results were supported by varying levels of evidence in favour of the null hypothesis in the 
Bayesian analysis: BF10 = 0.06 (condition); BF10 = 0.49 (prejudice group); BF10 = 0.55 
(interaction). Following precedent set by Ecker and colleagues (2014), each analysis detailed 




in the following sections was repeated with the exclusion of participants with fact-recall 
scores < 2. The exclusion of low-recall participants did not substantially alter the pattern of 
results for any of the three analyses conducted and is therefore not presented. 
Inferential reasoning. A two way between-subjects ANOVA (see Figure 1) on 
inference scores with the factors condition and ATIA group yielded a significant main effect 
of condition [F(3,199) = 58.77, MSE = 0.008, p < .001, ƞ2p = .470, BF10 = 3.72 x 1023]. There 
was no significant main effect of ATIA group [F(1,199) = 2.58, MSE = 0.008, p = .110, ƞ2p = 
.013, BF10 = 0.25], or interaction between the two factors [F(3,199) = 2.04, MSE = 0.008, p = 
.110, ƞ2p = .030, BF10 = 0.15], suggesting that participants who scored high versus low on the 
ATIA measure made an equivalent number of references to an Aboriginal robber both 
across and within conditions.1 
 
Figure 1. Mean inference scores across experimental conditions and racial prejudice groups 
(low, high) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
                                                          
1 Participants’ ATIA scores were also included as a continuous predictor, rather than relying 
on a median split, in a supplementary analysis of covariance. In this analysis, ATIA scores 
likewise did not significantly predict inference scores [F(1,202) = 2.89, MSE = 0.008, p = .091, 
ƞ2p = .014, BF10 = 0.57]. 




Due to the non-significant main effect of prejudice group and absence of an interaction with 
condition, inference scores were collapsed across groups. A one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA on mean inference scores across conditions yielded a significant effect of condition 
[F(3,203) = 56.98, MSE = 0.008, p < .001, ƞ2p = .457, BF10 3.73 x 1023]. Due to the need to 
conduct multiple follow-up pairwise contrasts, the target alpha was adjusted using the 
Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). The results of the contrast analysis (see Table 2) 
showed that the tendency to refer to an Aboriginal robber was highest in the only-affirmed 
condition (M = 0.24, SD = 0.13) and lowest in the only-negated condition (M = 0.02, SD = 
0.03), although scores in the only-negated condition were still significantly greater than 
zero, t(51) = 4.194, p < .001, BF10 = 209.18. Inference scores were significantly higher than 
the baseline only-negated condition in both the negated-then-reinstated (M = 0.09, SD = 
0.07) and affirmed-then-retracted (M = 0.11, SD = 0.09) conditions. Additionally, scores in 
both of these conditions were significantly lower than in the only-affirmed condition, and 
did not differ from each other.  
Table 2. Contrasts calculated on inference scores in Experiment 1. 
Contrast t df p Cohen’s d BF10 
1 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Only-negated 
7.00 102 <.001* >1 228.93 
2 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Only-affirmed 
7.31 102 <.001* >1 6.49 x 1012 
3 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Affirmed-then-retracted 
1.79 101 .077 0.35 0.50 
4 Only-negated vs. Only-affirmed 11.69 102 <.001* >1 1.14 x 1024 
5 Only-negated vs. Affirmed-
then-retracted 
7.50 101 <.001* >1 2.09 x 105 
6 Only-affirmed vs Affirmed-
then-retracted 
5.49 101 <.001* >1 3.80 x 108 
*Significant, Holm-Bonferroni corrected 





Turning first to the impact of pre-existing racial attitudes on the processing of race-
related (mis-)information, unexpectedly, and in contrast to Ecker and colleagues (2014), 
racial prejudice was not found to be a significant predictor of references to race-related 
(mis-)information generally. However, the lack of an interaction between prejudice group 
and condition, and specifically the finding that a retraction was equally effective for both 
high and low prejudice groups, replicates the results of Ecker and colleagues. Although the 
lack of a significant effect of ATIA group was surprising at first glance, we caution against an 
over-interpretation of this result given (a) the weak evidence for the null revealed by the BF 
analysis, and (b) the notable numerical difference in the same direction as in previous work. 
Turning to our main research question, we found that a reinstatement of initially-
negated information caused a significant increase in reliance relative to when that 
information was only negated, but it did not increase reliance on that information to the 
level observed when that information was presented as true throughout. On the contrary, 
the initial negation persisted to affect reasoning, consistent with a primacy account of the 
CIE. Our data therefore suggest that the CIE can occur regardless of whether the initially-
provided information constitutes an affirmation or a negation. Consequently, these data 
support the notion of a ‘reverse CIE’ rather than that of an ironic rebound effect. 
A remaining puzzle is why inference scores in the only-negated condition were 
significantly greater than zero. We cite two possible reasons for this effect: (a) participants 
relied on negated information despite knowing it was false, perhaps due to the difficulty of 
accurately interpreting and recalling negated information (Mckinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; 
Reichle, Carpenter, & Just, 2000); or (b) there was enough innuendo in the story to drive 
reliance up regardless of the negation (Ecker et al., 2014). Unfortunately, Experiment 1 was 




unable to differentiate between these two possibilities, as it lacked a no-misinformation 
reference condition in which Aboriginality was never mentioned. If scores in only-negated 
and no-misinformation conditions were of a comparable magnitude, then it could be 
concluded that the elevated level of misinformation reliance was simply due to narrative 
innuendo. By contrast, if the scores in a no-misinformation condition were lower than in the 
only-negated condition, then it could be inferred that the negation itself led to an elevated 
reliance on the misinformation.  
Experiment 2 was designed to tease apart these two possibilities, while also 
providing a general replication of the first study. Experiment 2 was conducted with a larger 
U.S. sample of participants in order to generalize our findings. To this end, materials were 
converted to be applicable in a U.S. context. 
Experiment 2 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants were presented with a fictitious news report 
about a stabbing that took place outside of a convenience store in the U.S. state of 
Arkansas. Five versions of the report were created. Four versions of the report mirrored 
those used in Experiment 1, with the exception that the information concerning the racial 
characteristic of the suspect (i.e., Aboriginality) was changed to information concerning 
their religious affiliation (i.e., Muslim). To further disentangle the effect of a simple 
negation, and in contrast to Experiment 1, a further version of the report was created that 
did not reference the religious affiliation of the suspect at all (no-misinformation control 
condition). Participants also completed the islamophobia scale developed by Lee, Gibbons, 
Thompson, and Timani (2009). Participants’ scores were used as a grouping factor similar to 
the ATIA scores in Experiment 1. In contrast to Experiment 1, which used a combination of 
pre-screening and a median split, participants in the current experiment were assigned to 




groups by selecting those that scored in the upper and lower terciles on the distribution of 
islamophobia scores (see results section for more detail on the split). Experiment 2 
therefore had a 5 (condition: only-negated, negated-then-reinstated, only-affirmed, 
affirmed-then-retracted, control) × 2 (islamophobia: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 
Method (The method and analysis plan for this study were pre-registered and are 
available at https://osf.io/75bda/) 
Participants. An a-priori power analysis using G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), based on the interaction effect size observed in Experiment 1, 
indicated that to achieve adequate power (1 – β = .8) required a sample of approximately 
560 participants. In total, 756 U.S.-based participants were recruited on MTurk. Based on a-
priori criteria, twenty-three participants were excluded from analysis due to: data recording 
errors (n = 3); task completion in under four minutes (n = 1; median completion time was 
493 seconds); self-acknowledged lack of attention (i.e., a “no” response to a question 
whether their data should be used for analysis - see below for details; n = 1); poor recall of 
materials (i.e., providing incorrect answers to both fact-check questions - see results section 
for details; n = 4); and inconsistent responding on the islamophobia measure (see stimuli 
section below for details; n = 14). The final sample size was thus N = 733 (369 females, 360 
males, 4 of undisclosed gender; age range 19-80, M = 39.79, SD = 12.52). Participants were 
paid US$0.45 for their participation. 
Stimuli (all stimuli are available at https://osf.io/njh2g/). A fictional news report 
was used that comprised 13 messages and concerned a stabbing at a convenience store in 
the town of Fulton, Arkansas. The news reports differed across conditions at sentence 4 – 
where the critical information concerning the religious affiliation of the suspect was 
introduced (in all but the only-affirmed and control conditions) – and sentence 11 – where 




the critical information was initially provided, retracted, or reinstated (in all but the only-
negated and control conditions – for detail see Table 3). Participants’ understanding of the 
report and their level of reliance on the critical religion-related information was assessed in 
a subsequent test phase. This consisted of two fact-recall questions, one open-ended event-
summary item, and eight scale-based inference items (scored from 0-7) as well as the 
islamophobia scale. The order of questions was kept constant for all participants to avoid 
responses to the islamophobia scale biasing responses to inference items. 
The fact-recall questions targeted arbitrary event details unrelated to the religious 
affiliation of the suspect (e.g., “What weapon was used in the attack?”). These questions 
were included to allow for the potential exclusion of participants who had not adequately 
encoded the news report. The event-summary item allowed participants to provide a 
response that did or did not mention the religious affiliation of the suspect (e.g., “A Muslim 
man stabbed someone at a convenience store” vs. “A man stabbed members of the public 
at a convenience store”). The eight scale-based inference items specifically probed 
participants’ reliance on the critical religious-affiliation information. For example, the item 
“Police should conduct investigations in the local mosque” should have received a high level 
of endorsement from participants who believed that the suspect was a Muslim, and a low 
level of endorsement if they did not. The final inference item targeted the critical 
information directly (“Was the attacker a Muslim?”). 
The islamophobia scale (Lee et al., 2009) consists of 16 items scored on five-point 
Likert scales, and measures attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in general. One item (“I 
dread the thought of having a professor that is a Muslim”) was removed from the measure 
due to it lacking relevance for the majority of the sample. As the remaining 15 items shared 
the same polarity, two reverse-coded items were added (“I feel comfortable in areas with 




large Muslim populations” and “Islam is a peaceful religion”). As these two items were not a 
part of the validated scale created by Lee and colleagues, responses did not contribute 
towards participants’ final islamophobia scores. However, scores on these two items were 
used to identify participants who responded inconsistently (i.e., uniformly to all items 
before reverse scoring) and thus were likely not paying attention to the content of the 
items. To identify inconsistent responders, we calculated the difference between the 
average score on the original items and the average score on the two reverse-coded items 
(after reverse-scoring). Participants were excluded from further analysis if their difference 
score was more than 2.2 interquartile ranges above the third quartile. 
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issued at 8pm 
stated that they 
now have a 







“A police bulletin 
issued at 
10:20pm stated 
that they now 
have a Muslim 
man in custody” 
“A police bulletin 
issued at 
10:20pm stated 
that they now 
have a Muslim 
man in custody” 
“[…] suspect is 
not a Muslim and 
the attack was 
not religiously 
motivated” 
NB: For pragmatic reasons sentences 4 and 11 from the control condition are not included as 
no reference was made to the religion of the attacker in either case. 
Procedure. Participants completed the task using the Qualtrics online survey 
platform (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Participants were first presented with an ethics-approved 
information sheet, which specified that participation in the online experiment would be 
taken as implied consent. The news report was presented one message at a time; each 




message remained on-screen for a pre-determined period (0.25 seconds per word), during 
which the participant was not able to continue. Participants then completed an unrelated 
anagram task for 1 min. The test items were then presented one at a time in the same order 
regardless of condition (i.e., fact-recall, event-summary, scale-based inference, and 
islamophobia items). At the end, participants were asked to indicate whether or not their 
data should be included in our analysis (“In your honest opinion, should we use your data in 
our analysis? This is not related to how well you think you performed, but whether you put 
in a reasonable effort.”). This question could be answered with “Yes, I put in a reasonable 
effort”; “Maybe, I was a little distracted”; or “No, I really wasn’t paying any attention”. 
Participants then received a debriefing sheet and their validation code for MTurk. The 
experiment took approximately 8 minutes. 
Results (data available at https://osf.io/teyu4/) 
Results are presented in accordance with our pre-registered analysis plan, with 
minor exceptions that are marked in the text. 
Coding procedure. As in Experiment 1, fact-recall questions were scored 0 for an 
incorrect response, and 1 for a correct response. Partial scores were not possible due to the 
multiple-choice format of the questions. The maximum fact-recall score was therefore 2. 
Upon inspection of the data, it became apparent that of those participants who had gotten 
only one fact-recall question wrong (n = 130), the overwhelming majority (n = 121) provided 
an incorrect answer to the first question (“How did the attacker flee the scene?”) but not 
the second. Inspection of these incorrect responses found that all but 9 participants had 
provided the same incorrect answer (“On foot”) instead of the correct answer (“In a van”). 
Because it is logically conceivable – and indeed likely in reality – that the attacker ran to his 
van to escape, both “On foot” and “In a van” were scored as correct answers to the first 




question, whereas the remaining two answers were scored as incorrect (as indicated earlier, 
participants who scored 0 on both questions were removed from subsequent analysis).  
The open-ended inference question (“Please provide a one-sentence summary of the 
events”) was scored either 0 or 1 by a trained scorer who was blind to condition. Any 
uncontroverted mention of a Muslim being the chief suspect (e.g., “A Muslim man stabbed 
members of the public at a convenience store”) received a score of 1. In contrast, any 
controverted statement (e.g., “Police arrest a Muslim man however find he was not 
responsible”), or any statement that did not reference the religious affiliation of the suspect 
received a score of 0.  As in Experiment 1, ambiguous responses were scored 0.5 (e.g., “At 
first police [said] that it was a Muslim person but the surveillance could not make the 
person out […]”). Scale-based inference items were scored on a scale from 0 (strongly 
disagree/very unlikely) to 7 (strongly agree/very likely), with higher numbers indicating 
greater belief in a Muslim suspect2. Scores on these items were recoded to lie between 0 
and 1 to be comparable to the open-ended item. Scores on the scale-based and open-ended 
items were then averaged to provide a single composite inference score ranging from 0 to 1; 
this was the main dependent variable of interest.  
Inferential reasoning. Due to the lack of a significant effect of prejudice group in 
Experiment 1, the data were first analysed without regard to islamophobia group (i.e., 
collapsed across groups). A one-way between-subjects ANOVA on mean inference scores 
across conditions yielded a significant effect of condition [F(4, 728) = 44.99, MSE = 0.042, p < 
.001, ƞ2p = .198, BF10 = 3.57 x 1030]. To explore the effect of condition, several planned 
contrasts were conducted. The results of these contrasts are reported in Table 4. First, to 
                                                          
2 One item was erroneously scored on a scale from 0-8. This was accounted for in the 
analysis. 




examine whether a negation drives an increase in the use of negated information above the 
level when that information is not mentioned, we assessed the difference between the 
control (M = 0.23, SD = 0.18) and only-negated (M = 0.18, SD = 0.17) conditions. Participants 
mentioned the critical information significantly less following a negation than if that 
information was never mentioned, although the corresponding Bayesian analysis indicated 
only very weak evidence for a difference between the two, meaning that this interpretation 
must be made with some caution. However, scores in the only-negated condition were 
nonetheless significantly above zero, t(148) = 12.91, p < .001, BF10 = 1.29 x 1022.  
Second, to examine the presence of the standard CIE, we compared scores in the 
affirmed-then-retracted (M = 0.28, SD = 0.23) and control conditions. The results showed 
that participants made significantly more references to the critical information following its 
retraction than if it was never mentioned, in line with the clear majority of CIE research, 
although this difference was not given much support by the Bayesian analysis (BF10 < 2). 
Finally, to explore how a reinstatement of initially-negated information influenced 
the subsequent use of that information, three further contrasts were computed. First, we 
compared inference scores between the negated-then-reinstated (M = 0.38, SD = 0.23) and 
only-affirmed (M = 0.46, SD = 0.22) conditions. It was found that participants made 
significantly fewer references to the critical information if it had been previously negated 
than when it appeared as true throughout. This difference represents a CIE of reversed 
polarity and replicates Experiment 1. Second, we compared inference scores between the 
negated-then-reinstated and only-negated conditions, revealing that participants made 
significantly more references to the critical information if it had been reinstated after an 
initial negation than when it was only negated. This reflects the effectiveness of a reversed-
polarity (i.e., affirmative) correction. Finally, we compared inference scores between the 




negated-then-reinstated and affirmed-then-retracted conditions. In contrast to Experiment 
1, reinstatement of initially-negated information resulted in a significantly higher number of 
references to the critical information than when this information was first presented as true 
but then subsequently retracted3. 
Table 4. Contrasts calculated on RTM scores in Experiment 2. 
Contrast t df p Cohen’s d BF10 
1 Control vs. Only-negated 2.59 292 .001* .30 1.08 
2 Affirmed-then-retracted vs. 
Control 
2.24 288 .026* .26 1.67 
3 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Only-affirmed 
2.97 296 .003* .34 13.45 
4 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Only-negated 
8.65 290 <.001* >1 4.70 x 1013 
5 Negated-then-reinstated vs. 
Affirmed-then-retracted 
3.61 286 <.001* .43 367.20 
*Significant, Holm-Bonferroni corrected 
 
Figure 2. Mean inference scores across experimental conditions and islamophobia groups 
(low, high) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
                                                          
3 In light of the significant CIE and reverse-CIE observed in both experiments, a further 
analysis (not preregistered) was conducted in order to examine whether a reinstatement 
resulted in a greater degree of updating than a retraction. This analysis revealed that the 
correction message was equally effective regardless of whether it was correcting an initial 
negation (i.e., a reinstatement) or an initial affirmation (i.e. a retraction, for more detail see 
supplementary material). 




Analyses split by islamophobia group. Additional analyses were conducted taking 
into account participants’ islamophobia scores (see Figure 2). Scores on the islamophobia 
measure ranged from 15 to 75 (representing the minimum and maximum possible scores on 
the measures). Participants were split into high and low islamophobia groups by taking the 
top and bottom terciles of the sample4.  The mean islamophobia score for the low group (n 
= 257) was M = 15.72 (SD = 1.25), and for the high group (n = 244) it was M = 56.68 (SD = 
10.44). A two way between-subjects ANOVA on inference scores with the factors condition 
and islamophobia group yielded a significant main effect of condition [F(4,491) = 43.15, MSE 
= 0.029, p < .001, ƞ2p = .260, BF10 = 3.52 x 1015] and islamophobia group [F(1,491) = 
375.36, MSE = 0.029, p < .001, ƞ2p = .433, BF10 = 5.43 x 1047], with those high in prejudice 
making significantly more references to the religious affiliation of the attacker across all 
conditions. There was also a significant interaction between the two factors [F(4,491) = 2.85, 
MSE = 0.029 p = .023, ƞ2p = .023, BF10 = 3.83].  
We explored the interaction with a set of analyses designed to look at the effect of 
islamophobia group membership on memory-updating following a correction (see Table 5). 
Analyses were split between updating following a retraction of prior information (analysis 1: 
only-affirmed – affirmed-then-retracted) and updating following a reinstatement of 
previously negated information (analysis 2: only-negated – negated-then-reinstated). The 
results across these analyses confirmed that for both groups, memory was updated 
following corrective information regardless of whether that information functioned as a 
retraction or a reinstatement. Additionally, it was found that participants high in 
islamophobia made more references to a Muslim suspect than did those in the low group 
                                                          
4 In the event that the score identifying a tercile boundary was shared by participants both 
above and below that boundary, all participants with that score were included in either the 
low or high islamophobia group.  




regardless of condition. However, when the correction functioned as a reinstatement, we 
observed a significant interaction between condition and islamophobia group that was 
absent when the correction functioned as a retraction, indicating that participants high in 
islamophobia updated their memory to a greater degree than those low in islamophobia.  
Although these data appear to suggest that correction-congruence effects may be 
unique to the presentation of a reinstatement, such a conclusion cannot be supported 
based solely upon the presence of a significant interaction in one analysis and its absence in 
the other (Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). In 
order to clarify interpretation of this difference, a final three-way [2 (group: high vs. low) × 2 
(correction stage: pre vs. post) × 2 (polarity: reinstatement vs. retraction)] ANOVA was 
conducted (analysis 3 in Table 5). This analysis yielded no significant interaction between 
the three factors, suggesting that the magnitude of memory updating between prejudice 
groups was equivalent following corrective information regardless of its polarity, and 
rendering us unable to draw strong conclusions about the attitude-congruence effect. 
Table 5: Results from analyses focused on memory updating following a correction 
(reinstatement or a retraction) for participants high versus low in islamophobia.  
 F ƞ2p p BF10 
(1) Updating following a retraction  
Condition (only-affirmed vs. 
affirmed-then-retracted) 
35.51 .149 <.001 1246.36 
Group (high vs. low) 135.15 .401 <.001 1.66 x 1018 
Condition x Group 0.64 .003 .425 0.23 
 
(2) Updating following a reinstatement 
 
Condition (only-negated vs. negated-
then-reinstated) 
85.04 .305 <.001 5.66 x 107 
Group (high vs. low) 164.14 .458 <.001 1.05 x 1019 
Condition x Group 11.32 .055 <.001 0.74 
 
(3) Updating - interaction with polarity 
 
Group x Correction Stage x Polarity 2.73 .007 .099 0.35 





Experiment 2 was designed to provide a conceptual replication of Experiment 1, in a 
different population and using different materials, while adding an additional control 
condition. In agreement with Experiment 1, we showed evidence for a reverse-CIE in that a 
reinstatement was not able to bring reliance on initially-negated information back to the 
level observed when that information was presented as true throughout. This confirms the 
robustness and generality of the reverse CIE. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, 
worldview produced clear differences in reliance on worldview-relevant information. In line 
with previous work (e.g., Ecker et al., 2014), across all conditions, participants who scored 
high on islamophobia made more references to the religion of the suspect than those who 
scored low; we take up this difference between studies in the General Discussion. Also in 
accord with previous work (e.g., Ecker et al., 2014; Wood & Porter, 2019), we found that the 
effectiveness of a retraction was not contingent on its congruence with participants’ 
attitudes. However, we found tentative evidence that attitude-congruence modulated the 
effectiveness of a reinstatement. Although these data suggest that the effect of pre-existing 
attitudes is unique to cases in which previously negated material is subsequently reinstated, 
we are unable to draw strong conclusions regarding this effect due to the weak evidence 
observed in the Bayes factor analysis, and the lack of a significant effect of polarity on the 
effectiveness of a correction. 
Finally, Experiment 2 afforded us an opportunity to examine whether the above-zero 
inference score in the only-negated condition of Experiment 1 resulted from the negated 
critical information ironically driving inferences up, or whether it was based just on 
spontaneous, innuendo-based references to the critical information. The fact that inference 
scores in Experiment 2 were higher in the no-misinformation control condition than the 




only-negated condition speaks against the former and suggests that the level of reliance in 
the control condition likely reflects a propensity to endorse any information suggested by 
the inference statement, either due to the level of innuendo present in the narrative or 
because people will spontaneously endorse anything. The provision of a negation therefore 
appeared to depress – but not eliminate – such “background” endorsement.  
General Discussion 
Previous research into the CIE has exclusively focused on examining the impact of 
corrective information in a single polarity – the retraction of initially-affirmed information. 
In two experiments we examined how the CIE would be affected by a reversal of this 
polarity – providing a reinstatement of initially-negated information. We hypothesised that 
such a reversal may result in one of two outcomes: either a reinstatement of initially-
negated material would result in a ‘reverse-CIE’ analogous to the conventional CIE, or it 
would result in the effective updating of memory to a level equivalent to when information 
is true throughout (or even beyond, i.e., an ‘ironic rebound effect’). Both our studies clearly 
ruled out the possibility of an ironic rebound effect. As noted at the outset, this possible 
outcome was tied to a ‘schema-plus-tag’ model in which the initial negation is not encoded 
as a single meaningful unit but rather as two dissociated representations – a core 
supposition (‘X’) and a negation-tag (‘not’, e.g., Mayo et al., 2004) – raising the possibility 
that a subsequent reinstatement (‘X’) may uniquely interact with the core supposition to 
form a representation that is as strong (or conceivably stronger) than just being exposed to 
‘X’ in isolation. As this effect was not observed, from here on we refrain from consideration 
of explanations that rely on this model of negation comprehension.  
Instead the data suggested that the continued influence of initially presented 
information is not modulated by its polarity. Corrective information appears to engender 




only partial belief updating, regardless of whether it corrects initially-affirmed or initially-
negated material. Such a ‘reverse-CIE’ effect – the finding that a reinstatement cannot 
entirely offset an initial negation – is concordant with the previous literature demonstrating 
continued influence in the typical affirmation-negation (i.e., misinformation-retraction) 
paradigm. However, although the results are quite clear, the particular cognitive 
mechanisms underlying this reverse-CIE, much like those that underlie traditional CIE 
effects, remain uncertain. Given the symmetry of these effects, our results lend support to 
the notion outlined in the Introduction that an initial negation is recoded into a single 
meaningful informational unit. Although our data do not speak directly to the processes 
involved, our remaining discussion focuses on the possible mechanisms that may underlie 
this recoding. 
As noted at the outset, a negation in the absence of prior information may be 
viewed pragmatically as a single assertive unit, and may therefore function no differently 
from an affirmation. This may occur because a negation is simply viewed as an assertion 
about a certain state of the world, meaning that the information contained therein is 
encoded at face-value. For example, the sentence “the suspects are local, male residents 
and none of them are of Aboriginal descent” may conceivably be encoded as an objective 
fact (i.e., there are no Aboriginal suspects; we revisit this potentially over-simplistic view 
later). Similarly, negations may be encoded as affirmations of their alternative attribute with 
the ‘core’ feature (‘X’) and its negation marker (‘not’) being incorporated into a single 
representation affirming the opposite ‘Y’ of the negated concept (Mayo et al., 2004). For 
example, consider the sentence “the suspect is not guilty”, which is amenable to an 
alternative encoding, namely, the suspect is innocent. Critically, in both cases the negation 
can be encoded as a single meaningful unit (‘not-X’ or ‘Y’, respectively), therefore an initial 




negation may be cognitively indistinct from an initial assertion. If this is the case, then a 
reinstatement, like a retraction, should perform the same cognitive role of correcting an 
earlier assertion of fact, and thus the underlying cognitive mechanisms should be 
indistinguishable. Although the exact nature of how such mechanisms produce the CIE is 
debated (see Chan et al., 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), theoretical models such as the 
KReC framework discussed earlier (Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014) favour the notion of 
concurrent storage where both the original misinformation and its later correction persist in 
memory. Both may therefore be candidates for subsequent activation (Gordon, Quadflieg, 
Brooks, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2019; for reviews see Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005; Kendeou et 
al., 2019; Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014; Kendeou, Walsh, Smith & O’Brien, 2014). If negations 
are indeed encoded as single meaningful units, then concurrent-storage accounts and 
processes specified by the KReC framework offer a reasonable explanation for the CIE 
regardless of its polarity.  
However, an additional account – one that could explain a reverse-CIE via a distinctly 
different cognitive mechanism – arises from further consideration of how a negation may be 
recoded as an affirmation of an alternative. Being able to transform a negation into an 
affirmation of the opposite largely depends upon its substantive ambiguity. While negations 
of information with specifically bipolar traits may be recoded (as above, the sentence “the 
suspect is not guilty” could be recoded as “the suspect is innocent”), more ambiguous 
negations (for instance, those concerning fuzzier ‘multi-level’ factors such as race or 
religion) may not be readily transformed in this fashion. For example, in Experiment 1, the 
‘not-Aboriginal’ negation specifies a unipolar trait (i.e., one that does not have a distinct 
alternative), as suspects could belong to a number of other races (e.g., Caucasian, Asian, 
Indian, etc.). Therefore, in the context of the current work, the encoding of a negation as an 




affirmation of its alternative attribute may be too simple an explanation for the effects 
observed. Instead, exposure to negating information not previously encountered may 
trigger the spontaneous generation of several simulated alternatives to the negated 
concept, consistent with the dominant ‘rejection-based’ account of negation 
comprehension (Dale & Duran, 2011; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, 
Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007; Lüdtke, Friedrich, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2008). This model of negation 
comprehension suggests that a reinstatement may activate multiple conflicting 
representations that draw activation away from the correct representation (i.e., the 
reinstatement), which may reduce the likelihood of its subsequent retrieval (Gerrig & 
O’Brien, 2005; Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014), leading to a reverse-CIE via a markedly different 
process than the one outlined previously. Further empirical adjudication examining the 
methods by which an initial negation is processed will be required to clarify the relative 
contributions of the above possibilities. 
As foreshadowed in the Discussion of Experiment 2, our paradigm also provided us 
with a unique opportunity to test the impact of only-negated narratives on subsequent 
critical information reliance, an area that CIE research has thus far neglected. Across both 
experiments, we found that only-negated narratives produced non-zero levels of inference 
during the subsequent retrieval phase. While Experiment 1 was unable to determine the 
cause for this non-zero effect, Experiment 2 clarified that only-negated narratives produced 
significantly fewer misinformation inferences than a control condition in which the 
misinformation was never mentioned. This result suggests that, rather than the negation 
driving a paradoxical increase in inference, the non-zero scores in the only-negated 
condition likely reflected low baseline levels of inference that were driven by the presence 
of innuendo in the narrative. Moreover, although the only-negated condition was originally 




included in order to provide a comparison with the negated-then-reinstated condition, it 
may in fact serve as a more appropriate control condition against which to assess the typical 
CIE (i.e., via comparison to the affirmed-then-retracted condition). The significantly higher 
level of inference in the no-misinformation (i.e., typical) control condition relative to the 
only-negated condition suggests that scores in the typical control condition may actually 
represent participants’ willingness to endorse any information suggested by the inference 
probes at retrieval. In contrast, only-negated narratives appear to decrease – but not 
eliminate – such “background” endorsement. An only-negated condition may thus provide a 
more appropriate control condition for typical CIE research than a no-misinformation 
condition, as the latter may lead to an underestimation of CIE magnitude due to background 
propensity to endorse information in the absence of relevant-knowledge.  
A secondary aim of this study was to assess the effects of pre-existing attitudes on 
information-processing across experimental conditions, as the congruence of a 
reinstatement or a retraction with a participant’s pre-existing beliefs could conceivably 
impact its effectiveness. However, the evidence was not entirely consistent across the two 
experiments and we therefore keep our discussion brief. In Experiment 2, we found that 
prejudicial attitudes determined to an extent what information participants relied upon in 
their reasoning: We found that participants scoring higher on a prejudice measure were 
more likely to refer to a suspect from that prejudiced group generally, that is, regardless of 
narrative condition (In Experiment 1, the main effect of prejudice tended in the same 
direction but failed to reach significance.) There are at least two possible reasons for this 
divergence between experiments. First, the size and make-up of our samples differed 
considerably: Experiment 1 investigated attitude effects in a relatively small sample of 
university students, whereas Experiment 2 canvassed members of the U.S. public. This 




difference in the sample demographics may have influenced the results. For instance, 
although prejudice against Aboriginals is well-documented in Australia, university students 
in Australia display less prejudice towards Aboriginal people than the general public 
(Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994; Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994; Pedersen & Walker, 
1997). Second, and perhaps more important, our two experiments addressed different 
types of prejudice. While Experiment 1 examined racial prejudice towards Aboriginals, 
Experiment 2 examined prejudice against Muslims. One consequence of this change is that 
Experiment 2 examined a significantly more salient prejudice in light of the current global 
socio-political landscape. Islamophobia and the stigmatisation of Muslims has been 
amplified globally in recent years (Braunstein, 2017), particularly in the U.S. (Ogan, Willnat, 
Pennington, & Bashir, 2013). It is therefore reasonable to assume that Islamophobic beliefs 
are more prevalent in the general public in the U.S. than anti-Aboriginal sentiments are in 
Australia. We therefore suggest that the differences in the effect of prejudice across our two 
experiments may be, at least partly, driven by the increased salience of Muslim stereotypes 
in the current global climate.  
Nevertheless, our finding that participants higher in prejudice measure were more 
likely to refer to a suspect from that prejudiced group replicates prior research also 
demonstrating a significant effect of pre-existing attitudes on mean level of reliance on 
attitude-relevant information (Berinsky, 2012; Ecker et al., 2011, 2014; Kull et al., 2003; 
Travis, 2010). Additionally (and consistent across both experiments), we found a retraction 
to be effective in reducing reliance on critical information for both high and low prejudice 
groups, consistent with the findings of Ecker and colleagues (2014). These data therefore 
support the notion that post-retraction differences in misinformation reliance may actually 
reflect pre-retraction differences, rather than attitude-congruence effects impacting the 




effectiveness of the retraction (Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Nyhan, et al., 
2013; also see Ecker & Ang, 2019; Wood & Porter, 2019). Conversely, in the other polarity, 
we found tentative evidence that a reinstatement (after an initial negation) was more 
effective when it was attitude-congruent. Given the assumed complexities of negation 
comprehension detailed above, it is entirely possible that pre-existing beliefs uniquely 
interact with how an initial-negation (as opposed to an initial-affirmation) is processed by 
the reader and therefore affect its amenability to later correction. For instance, consistent 
with the scepticism notion outlined in the introduction, a participant high in prejudice may 
view an initial-negation of a Muslim attacker with a higher degree of suspicion (reasoning 
that negating the religious affiliation of the attacker implies that it may be a plausible but 
unarticulated assumption), thereby enhancing the effectiveness of a later reinstatement. 
However, we must refrain from an over-interpretation of this finding given that (a) both 
high- and low-prejudice participants updated their memory following a reinstatement (the 
difference was simply numerically larger for high-prejudice participants), and (b) the 
evidence in favour of an interaction between prejudice and polarity was weak. Nonetheless, 
this tentative finding is deserving of further investigation.  
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